Undergraduate Review
Volume 8

Article 14

2012

Juvenile Life Without Parole
Kallee Spooner

Follow this and additional works at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Spooner, Kallee (2012). Juvenile Life Without Parole. Undergraduate Review, 8, 74-80.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev/vol8/iss1/14

This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
Copyright © 2012 Kallee Spooner

Juvenile Life Without Parole
Kallee Spooner

Kallee Spooner is
a senior majoring
in criminal justice
and philosophy.
This research was
conducted in the summer of 2011
under the mentorship of Dr. Richard
Wright and was funded by an Adrian
Tinsley Program (ATP) summer
research grant. Kallee is grateful for
the opportunities made possible by
ATP, and truly appreciates Dr. Wright’s
constant support. In the fall of 2012,
Kallee will begin the pursuit of a Ph.D.
in criminology.

T

he purpose of this paper is to analyze data, policy trends, and legal
concerns on the issue of sentencing juvenile offenders to life without
the possibility of parole (LWOP). Policy changes in the 1980s and 90s
dramatically changed the sentencing outcomes for juvenile offenders.
Significantly departing from the rehabilitative goals established by the juvenile
court, states adopted harsher punishments, including LWOP. During this
shift, the diminished culpability of youth became insignificant when compared
to the nature of their crimes. The recent cases of Roper v. Simmons (2005)
and Graham v. Florida (2010) reinstated the importance of recognizing that
juveniles are different from adults, and accordingly should not be subjected to the
same punishments. In light of these decisions, the constitutionality of sentencing
juveniles to LWOP will be addressed.
Policy Trends and Data
Punitive sentencing trends initiated during the late twentieth century have
resulted in an increased application of the sentence of life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders. From 1962 to 1981,
an average of two juvenile offenders received LWOP sentences each year
(Human Rights Watch, 2008). Beginning in 1982, annual increases were
reported, peaking at 152 youth in 1996 (Human Rights Watch, 2008).
Although crime rates have declined since 1994, it is estimated that the rate
at which states sentence youth to LWOP is three times higher than it was in
1992 (Hechinger, 2011). Human Rights Watch (2010) reports that 2,574
individuals are currently serving LWOP for crimes they committed when
they were under the age of eighteen.
Today, the United States is the only country in the world that actively sentences
juveniles to LWOP (Human Rights Watch, 2008). LWOP conflicts with
provisions of international law, including Article 37 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) that prohibits life sentences
for juveniles. Contrary to global law and practice, forty-four states and the
federal government permit juvenile LWOP (Koppel, 2010). All of these states
impose LWOP on a mandatory or presumptive basis for certain offenses (e.g.
first-degree murder) (Human Rights Watch, 2008).
The following Table 5.1 breaks down the number of youth serving LWOP
by state. California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania have the
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largest number of youth sentenced to LWOP. More than half
of all the juveniles sentenced to LWOP are in these five states.

State
		
		
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

juveniles (59%) sentenced to LWOP are first-time offenders
(Human Rights Watch, 2008). Twenty-six percent of juveniles
sentenced to LWOP were convicted of felony murder. Felony
murder is charged when a youth participated in a robbery or
TABLE 5.1
burglary while a co-participant committed murder, without
# of Juveniles
State
# of Juveniles the knowledge or intent of the youth (Human Rights Watch,
2008). Sentencing juveniles to LWOP for felony murder
Sentenced 		
Sentenced
seems particularly harsh considering their inability to foresee
to LWOP		
to LWOP
long-term consequences of their actions, and their increased
62
Montana
1
susceptibility to peer pressure.
No LWOP
Nebraska
24
32
73
250
48
9
7
No LWOP
266
8
4
4
103
2
44
No LWOP
5
335
0
13
57
346
2
24
116

Nevada
16
New Hampshire
3
New Jersey
0
New Mexico
No LWOP
New York
0
North Carolina
44
North Dakota
1
Ohio
2
Oklahoma
48
Oregon
No LWOP
Pennsylvania
444
Rhode Island
2
South Carolina
26
South Dakota
9
Tennessee
4
Texas
5
Utah
1
Vermont
0
Virginia
48
Washington
28
West Virginia
0
Wisconsin
16
Wyoming
6
Federal
36

Source: Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth (2009). http://
www.endjlwop.org/the-issue/stats-by-state/

Proponents of juvenile LWOP argue that the sentence is
applied sparingly as it is reserved for chronic and violent
offenders. From 1980-2008, juvenile offenders committed
44,357 homicides, yet there are only 2,445 juveniles serving
LWOP for homicide offenses (Puzzanchera & Kang, 2010).
This means that less than six percent of juvenile homicide
offenders were sentenced to LWOP. These numbers suggest
that the sentence of LWOP has been sparingly applied to
juvenile homicide offenders.
However, contrary to proponents’ beliefs, juvenile LWOP is
not only reserved for the worst of the worst. The majority of
BridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

The data also suggests that there may be gender and racial
biases in juvenile LWOP sentencing. Males comprise the
majority of the juvenile LWOP population. For example, in
Massachusetts, all of the youth sentenced to LWOP are males
(Monahon, 2009). In Michigan, 98% of juvenile LWOP
inmates are male and only 2% are female (LaBelle, Phillips, &
Horton, 2004).
The evidence also shows that Black youth are disproportionately
sentenced to LWOP when compared to White youth. Black
youth are sentenced to LWOP at a rate of ten times that of
white youth (Human Rights Watch, 2008). In addition,
Human Rights Watch (2008) found that Black youth
arrested for murder were sentenced to LWOP at a rate of 1.59
times that of White youth. Although Black offenders are
disproportionately a part of both the adult and juvenile justice
systems, issues of racial bias deserve additional consideration in
LWOP sentencing.
The sentence of LWOP is particularly harsh for juveniles given
their vulnerability in adult correctional facilities. According
to Monahon (2009), juveniles are vulnerable because of their
size, lack of experience in the system, and lack of peer support
groups. Compared to youth in juvenile facilities, juveniles
incarcerated in adult prisons are five times more likely to be
sexually assaulted, and almost twice as likely to be attacked with
a weapon by inmates or beaten by staff (Redding, 2010). In
order to protect themselves from physical violence, including
rape, many youth engage in fights in prison (Human Rights
Watch, 2008).
The sentence of LWOP communicates to youth that they are
irredeemable and can never reenter society. LWOP inmates
may obtain release via sentence commutation or pardon,
however this rarely occurs (Leigey, 2010). With little hope of
release, juveniles sentenced to LWOP are at risk of self-harm
and suicide (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Juveniles in adult
facilities are eight times more likely to commit suicide than
youth in juvenile facilities (Redding, 2010). In addition,
juveniles sentenced to LWOP often lose important family and
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pro-social bonds (Butler, 2010). For example, they can be
incarcerated in an institution that is far from their family and
some prison policies limit phone calls, thus inhibiting visits
and communication. Pro-social ties and support help inmates
adjust to prison life (Rocque, Bierie, & MacKenzie, 2010).
Loss of supportive family members could contribute to their
sense of hopelessness.
Leigey (2010) conducted a study addressing the mental health
of inmates sentenced to LWOP. Using data from a 2004
survey of inmates in state and federal correctional facilities as
well as conducting interviews with twenty-five LWOP inmates
in a mid-Atlantic state, Leigey found that the initial stages of
incarceration are particularly stressful (Leigey, 2010). This is
evidenced by the higher likelihood of reported mental illness
among LWOP inmates who had served less than ten and a half
years. Respondents reported improved mental health over the
course of their incarceration, attributing their mental wellness
to a positive outlook and hope of release. Further, the study
found that most inmates did not rely on mental health services
to help them adjust to prison life. A small subset of respondents
reported a smoother transition to prison life because they had
already served time prior to their LWOP sentence. However,
these inmates admitted that adjusting to a LWOP sentence is
different than adjusting to a shorter sentence (Leigey, 2010).
Although this sample did not include inmates who were
sentenced to LWOP as juveniles, it provides an outlook on the
challenges that juveniles may face in adult correctional facilities.
Given the vulnerability of youth in adult prisons, it is likely
that they will experience an increased risk of mental health
issues during the initial stages of their sentence. Additionally,
while the sample size is relatively small, this study provides
meaningful qualitative data on the mental state of inmates
sentenced to LWOP.
Since individuals serving LWOP are not likely to be released, it
is extremely difficult for them to gain entrance to educational or
skill-building programs in prison. Monahon (2009) suggested
that this is because individuals serving LWOP are not seen as
needing to learn or develop skills since they will never be free
again. Unfortunately, juveniles sentenced to LWOP are denied
opportunities to develop and reform at a time in their life when
they most need it.
Sentencing individuals to LWOP assumes that they will be a
danger to society for the remainder of their lives. Contrary
to this assumption, recidivism rates are low among older
inmates, including individuals serving life who are released
(Nellis, 2010). Mauer, King, and Young (2004) reported that
four out of five individuals serving life who were released in
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1994 were not arrested for a new crime three years after their
release. Whereas only one third of all offenders released from
prison were not arrested within three years of release. These
figures suggest that with age, most offenders become less of a
danger to society. Research about LWOP sentencing is critical
in determining effectiveness and constitutionality. With a
comprehensive understanding of relevant data, this paper will
now explore the legal issues of sentencing juveniles to LWOP.
Legal Issues of Juvenile LWOP
In Graham v. Florida (2010), the majority of the Supreme
Court ruled in a 6-to-3 vote that sentencing juveniles to
LWOP for non-homicide offenses was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause, and thus
unconstitutional. This ruling did not require states to release
juvenile non-homicide offenders, but states must afford these
offenders meaningful opportunity to get parole based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation (Graham v. Florida,
2010). Graham applied to the 129 prisoners serving LWOP
for non-homicide crimes committed as juveniles (Hechinger,
2011).
Prior to the Graham decision, the Supreme Court had
established two tests, one for capital cases and the other for
noncapital cases, to determine if the Eighth Amendment’s cruel
and unusual punishments clause had been violated. Capital
cases employed a categorical approach, whereas noncapital
cases used a balancing test. In Graham, the Supreme Court
applied the categorical approach to a noncapital case, departing
from previously established procedures.
Supreme Court Procedures to Determine the
Constitutionality of Punishment in Capital and
Noncapital Cases
In capital cases, the court requires a two-step test to decide
whether certain categories of offenders or offenses should be
excluded from the death penalty (Siegler & Sullivan, 2011).
At step one, the court determines whether there is a national
consensus against the death penalty. To do this, the court looks
at the number of jurisdictions that allow the death penalty
and how often it is imposed for a particular offense or class of
offender.
At step two, the court makes an “independent judgment”
on whether the death penalty for a certain crime or class of
offenders violates the Eighth Amendment (Roper v. Simmons,
2005). In this analysis, the court weighs the nature of the
offense and the culpability of the offender against the severity
of the punishment. The court also considers the penological
justifications for the death penalty (i.e. retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation). Additionally, the court
BridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

takes into account any international consensus against the
punishment as an instructive means to interpret the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
(Siegler & Sullivan, 2011).
In noncapital cases, the court applies a balancing test on a
case-by-case basis. The balancing test is used to determine
whether a particular punishment is disproportionate to the
crime committed (Siegler & Sullivan, 2011). The balancing
test consists of two stages.
At stage one, the court determines whether the defendant has
established “an inference of gross disproportionality” (Harmelin
v. Michigan, 1991). In this analysis, the court weighs the nature
of the offense and the culpability of the offender against the
type of sentence imposed. For example, the court might rule
disproportionate a first-time juvenile drug offender sentenced
to 50 years in prison. In the rare case that the defendant proves
gross disproportionality, the court then moves to stage two
(Siegler & Sullivan, 2011).
At stage two, the court considers sentences imposed on other
offenders in the same jurisdiction and sentences imposed for
the same crime in other jurisdictions (Solem v. Helm, 1983).
In these analyses, the court looks at both the legislatively
permitted sentences and the actual sentencing outcomes
(Siegler & Sullivan, 2011).
Supreme Court Jurisprudence in Graham v. Florida
In Graham v. Florida (2010), the Supreme Court used the
categorical approach to come to their decision. First, the
court determined that there was a national consensus against
sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders to LWOP. Thirtyseven states and the federal government allowed LWOP for
juvenile non-homicide offenders, however the sentence was
used infrequently. Florida accounted for 77 of the 109 juvenile
non-homicide offenders serving LWOP in 2010 (National
Conference of State Legislatures, 2010). The remaining 52
were incarcerated in just ten states and the federal system
(Graham v. Florida, 2010). These figures demonstrated that
youth were disproportionately sentenced to LWOP in a small
number of states.
Second, the majority made an “independent judgment” that
LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenders violated the Eighth
Amendment. In this analysis, the court weighed the nature of
the offense and culpability of the offenders against the severity
of the sentence, considered the penological justifications, and
took into account international law and practice.
Although non-homicide offenses can be quite violent, they are
different from murder in severity and irrevocability. Life is
BridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

taken from the victim of a murderer, but the victim of a nonhomicide crime still has a chance to live. Writing the majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy argued, “the court has recognized
that defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that
life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most
serious forms of punishment than are murderers” (Graham v.
Florida, 2010).
Considering the culpability of juveniles, Justice Kennedy
referred to Roper v. Simmons (2005). In Roper v. Simmons
(2005) the court held in a 5-to-4 vote that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments categorically prohibit capital
punishment for offenders who were under eighteen when they
committed the offense. The majority in Roper cited scientific
and sociological studies on the salient characteristics of juveniles
that distinguished them from adults. The court recognized
that juveniles lack maturity, have an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, are vulnerable to negative influences (e.g. peer
pressure), and have not developed fixed characteristics (Roper
v. Simmons, 2005).
Further demonstrating the differences in culpability between
youth and adults, Justice Kennedy alluded to developments in
psychology and brain science. The research in these fields has
shown that juveniles are more capable of change because parts
of the brain involved in behavior control continue to develop
through late adolescence. Justice Kennedy wrote, “because
juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the
most severe punishments” (Graham v. Florida, 2010).
Regarding the severity of the sentence, Justice Kennedy
recognized that LWOP is not the same as the death penalty,
yet both sentences share characteristics. Both sentences are
irrevocable. In both sentences, those convicted have no hope
for restoration, except in the case of an executive clemency, the
possibility of which does not make the sentence any less harsh.
Both sentences communicate to convicted offenders that they
are irredeemable, incapable of change, and will never be fit to
reenter society (Graham v. Florida, 2010).
Justice Kennedy maintained, “life without parole is an especially
harsh punishment for a juvenile” (Graham v. Florida, 2010).
Juveniles will serve on average more time than adults sentenced
to LWOP, making the sentence disproportionately longer for
youth. A minor sentenced to LWOP will serve virtually his
or her entire life in ignominious confinement (Brief amicus
curiae of the Juvenile Law Center in Graham v. Florida, 2009).
The juvenile sentenced to LWOP will never experience free
adulthood (Brief amicus curiae of the American Psychological
Association in Graham v. Florida, 2009).
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Additionally, the Justice Kennedy determined, “none of the
goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate
– retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
– provide an adequate justification” for sentencing juvenile
non-homicide offenders to LWOP (Graham v. Florida, 2010).
The purposes of retribution are to express society’s moral
condemnation of a crime and to seek restoration of the moral
imbalance. Roper established that “retribution is not as strong
with a minor as with an adult” (Roper v. Simmons, 2005).
Justice Kennedy argued that retribution does not justify
sentencing juveniles to such a harsh punishment given their
diminished culpability (Graham v. Florida, 2010).
Furthermore, the majority found that deterrence does not
justify LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenders because
juveniles are less likely than adults to be discouraged from
committing crime. This is because juveniles are less capable
than adults to consider the long-term consequences of their
actions. When compared to adults, youth are less likely to
think about possible punishments when they decide to commit
crimes (Graham v. Florida, 2010).
The purpose of incapacitation is to ensure public safety
by keeping those at high risk to reoffend off the streets.
Incapacitation does not justify sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to LWOP because if the offender can
be rehabilitated, then there is no need to incapacitate that
offender. Justice Kennedy argued, “a life without parole
sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to
demonstrate change and maturity” (Graham v. Florida, 2010).
Although a youth may seem at high risk of harming others
upon conviction, LWOP erroneously assumes that the youth
will always be a high risk. Considering the transient nature of
youthfulness, it is wrong to presuppose that a juvenile offender
will not change.
Lastly, the majority determined that rehabilitation does not
justify LWOP for juvenile non-homicide offenders because
the sentence of LWOP denies youthful offenders the right
to reenter society. A sentence of LWOP communicates that
the juvenile offender is irredeemable. This judgment is not
warranted given the capacity of youth to change and their
diminished moral culpability. Further, rehabilitation is not
accomplished by this sentence because individuals sentenced
to LWOP are often denied access to rehabilitative services (e.g.
vocational training, education). The denial of rehabilitative
services and treatment makes LWOP for juveniles especially
severe considering their receptivity and need for rehabilitation
(Graham v. Florida, 2010).
After the majority considered the penological justifications, it
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then took into account international law and practice. Justice
Kennedy noted that the United States is the only nation that
actively imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile non-homicide
offenders (Graham v. Florida, 2010). Outside of the United
States, only ten countries allow LWOP for juveniles. Only
Israel imposes this sentence currently, and in Israel there are
only seven prisoners serving LWOP for crimes committed
as juveniles (De La Vega & Leighton, 2008). The majority
considered international consensus as instructive in making
this decision.
Significant Departure from Previous Jurisprudence
In his dissent, Justice Thomas stated, “for the first time in its
history, the court declares an entire class of offenders immune
from a noncapital sentence using the categorical approach it
had previously reserved for death penalty cases alone” (Graham
v. Florida, 2010). The majority offered three justifications
for using the categorical approach, instead of the case-bycase approach, in the case of juveniles facing LWOP for nonhomicide crimes.
In their first justification, the majority referred to the general
proposition in Roper that juveniles are categorically less
culpable and more capable of reform than adult offenders.
The majority argued that sentencing authorities lack the means
to sufficiently identify the few persistent juvenile offenders
who might deserve the harshest penalty available (Siegler &
Sullivan, 2011). The second justification was that the caseby-case approach does not take into account the difficulties
of counsel in representation. Juveniles are generally less able
than adults to assist their counsel, resulting in an impairment
of the quality of defense. The psychological immaturity of
youth impacts the way in which they perceive legal processes
and make choices. Adolescents tend to focus on short-term
consequences because they lack the ability to think about longterm outcomes. This deficit in decision-making faculties could
lead them to make adjudicative decisions (e.g. waive rights,
plea bargain) that they would not make as a reasonable adult
(Grisso & Schwartz, 2000). The third justification was that
the “categorical rule gives all juvenile non-homicide offenders
a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform” (Graham v.
Florida, 2010).
The court chose to use the categorical rule because the caseby-case approach would most likely lead to the imposition of
LWOP on juvenile offenders who are not culpable enough to
deserve it or who are capable of maturation and rehabilitation
(Siegler & Sullivan, 2011). Some juvenile non-homicide
offenders may be seen as deserving the harshest available
punishment, however most deserve a second chance. Before
Graham, it was nearly impossible for juvenile offenders in nonBridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

homicide cases to prove their sentences unconstitutional. In
fact, under the balancing test only a handful of defendants
won relief at the state and federal appellate court level (Siegler
& Sullivan, 2011). Thus, the Supreme Court applied the
categorical rule in order to protect less culpable juvenile nonhomicide offenders from disproportionate sentences.
Application to Juvenile Homicide Offenders
Graham applied to the 129 individuals sentenced to LWOP
for non-homicide crimes committed as juveniles. Juvenile
non-homicide offenders represented a fraction of the entire
population of youth sentenced to LWOP. It is estimated
that there are 2,445 individuals currently serving LWOP for
homicide offenses committed as juveniles (Human Rights
Watch, 2010). If the Supreme Court were to determine the
constitutionality of sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to
LWOP, the court would have to (1) consider whether there
is a national consensus against the sentence, and (2) make
an “independent judgment” on whether LWOP for juvenile
homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.
There are objective indicators of a national consensus against
sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to LWOP. Of the
forty-four states that allow LWOP for juvenile homicide
offenders, twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia
have ten or fewer individuals serving LWOP for committing
homicide as juveniles. Only seven states have one hundred
or more individuals serving LWOP for crimes committed as
juveniles (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2010).
This suggests that a minority of states are disproportionately
sentencing youth to LWOP.
In making an “independent judgment” on whether LWOP for
juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment,
the court would weigh the nature of the offense and culpability
of the offenders against the severity of the sentence, consider the
penological justifications, and take into account international
law and practice. Roper and Graham both support the
proposition that juveniles are categorically less culpable. The
majority in Graham made a distinction between the nature of
homicide and non-homicide offenses. It is important to note,
however, that in Graham the majority was concerned that initial
decision makers might give too much weight to the seriousness
of the offense and not enough to the reduced culpability of
the offender, resulting in many juveniles sentenced to LWOP
who arguably do not deserve such a harsh sentence (Siegler &
Sullivan, 2011).
In addition, a case could be made that sentencing juvenile
homicide offenders to LWOP does not meet the defined
penological justifications. All of the rejections of the
BridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

penological goals found in Graham could be applied to juvenile
homicide offenders. Considering youth’s inherent capacity to
change and their diminished moral culpability, none of the
penological goals justify sentencing juveniles to LWOP.
Furthermore, the international consensus against sentencing
juvenile homicide offenders to LWOP should be noted. For
example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), ratified by the United States in 1992,
demands that no one should be subject to cruel or inhumane
punishments, that juveniles must be separated from adults in
correctional facilities, and that sentencing authorities should
promote rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. Although the
United States reserves the right to treat juveniles as adults in
exceptional circumstances, the number of youth transferred to
adult court and sentenced to adult punishments suggests that
the United States has abused this right (Hechinger, 2011).
Additionally, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
prohibits LWOP for juvenile offenders (CRC, 1990). Every
self-governing nation in the world has both signed and ratified
the CRC. Only the United States and Somalia have failed to
ratify the CRC (Hechinger, 2011). Furthermore, in 2007 the
United Nations General Assembly called for the abolition of
LWOP for juveniles. Out of 184 parties, the United States
was the only dissenter (Hechinger, 2011). An international
consensus against sentencing juveniles to LWOP is instructive
in determining the constitutionality of the sentence.
In the 2011 term, the Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments
for two cases dealing with the sentence of LWOP for juvenile
homicide offenders. The court will hear these two cases in
March 2012 and render a decision likely by the end of June
2012. In the first case, Jackson v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court
will consider the constitutionality of (1) sentencing a 14-yearold convicted of felony murder to LWOP, and (2) mandatory
sentencing schemes that necessarily result in juvenile LWOP.
In the second case, Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court will
determine whether sentencing a 14-year-old to LWOP violates
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment. In these cases, the Supreme Court
will focus on the specific age group of 13 to 14 year olds. It
is not clear how the court will rule. The court may abolish
the sentence completely or in limited circumstances (e.g.
mandatory sentences, felony murder), or conclude that LWOP
for 13- and 14-year-old homicide offenders is constitutional.
In conclusion, there is evidence to suggest that sentencing
juveniles to LWOP is unconstitutional. Recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence in Roper and Graham has established that
juveniles are less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation
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than adults, and thus they are less deserving of the most severe
punishments. Sentencing juveniles to LWOP disregards these
developmental differences and treats youth like fully responsible
adults. Criminals should be held responsible for their crimes,
but not at the expense of constitutional rights.
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